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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we measure currency carry trade funding risk using stock market
volatility and crash risk in Japan, the main funding currency country. We show that
the measures of funding risk in Japan can explain 42% of the monthly currency carry
trade returns during our sample period, 2000-2011. In addition, they explain 64% of
the monthly foreign exchange volatility in our sample of ten main currencies, 28% of the
speculatorsnet currency futures positions in Australian dollar versus Japanese yen,
skewness in currency returns and currency crashes. We present a theoretical model
that is consistent with these ndings.
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"In most of the world in the past week, attention has been on highly leveraged
hedge funds that have been forced to dump assets bought on margin. In Japan,
however, a di¤erent species of margin trader has - until now, at least - stood rm:
the housewife. On her shoulders may lie responsibility for some of the stability
of the global nancial system....(carry trades) made fortunes for international in-
vestors but, lately, Japanese retail investors had become the carry trades greatest
enthusiasts. The metaphorical Mr and Mrs Watanabe account for around 30%
of the foreign-exchange market in Tokyo by value and volume of transactions,
according to currency traders, double the share of a year ago. Meanwhile, the
size of the retail market has more than doubled to about $15 billion a day. One
reason for the surge is margin trading. Brokers are o¤ering leverage of as much
as 200 times the down-payment (though the average is more like 20 to 40 times).
In July Japanese retail investorsshort positions on the yen (a bet that it would
fall) exceeded the amount taken by traders on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange,
a foreign-exchange trading hub. "The gnomes of Zurich were accused in their
day of destabilising markets. The housewives of Tokyo are apparently acting to
stabilise them," boasted Kiyohiko Nishimura, a Bank of Japan board member, in
July." (The Economist, August 2007)
In this paper, we investigate how the nancial market conditions in a major carry trade
funding country, Japan, a¤ect the global currency markets and currency trading. Although
we focus on Japan, our results may apply more generally, as in many cases similar results
are obtained in relation to another carry trade funding country, Switzerland. The quote
from The Economist above suggests that, rst, the popularity of carry trades amongst the
Japanese retail investors is large enough so that their collective actions can inuence the
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global currency markets. Second, as the Japanese investors use large amount of leverage,
those investors funding availability, and funding risk, are also likely to a¤ect the global
currency markets. Besides a¤ecting the currency markets via the Japanese investors, the
funding availability and funding risk in yen may a¤ect the currency markets through their
e¤ect on the carry trading activities of investors outside the Japan.
We proxy the funding risk in Japanese yen by the options implied stock market volatility
and crash risk in the Japanese stock market, estimated using an approach set forth in Santa-
Clara and Yan (2010). There are several reasons to believe that these Japanese equity market
risks reect carry trade investorsyen funding risks, and inuence the Japanese and foreign
investorsability and willingness to engage in currency carry trades involving shorting of yen.
First, to the extent that the local equity market prices a¤ect the available collateral for local
investors at any given point in time, the expected stock market volatility and crash risk in
the Japanese equity market reect risks in the future value of the local investorscollateral.
Given this, higher volatility and crash risk in the Japanese stock market reduce the banks
willingness to accept Japanese equity as collateral in their loans to local carry trade investors
(collateral is also required when implementing carry trades using forward contracts). Second,
as banks in Japan are large investors in the local equity market themselves, see e.g. Franks,
Mayer and Miyajima (2013), the Japanese banksability to lend money also deteriorates in
case of a stock market crash in Japan. This e¤ect is reinforced if the banksown equity market
valuations a¤ect their lending capacity, as argued by Adrian and Shin (2010). Realizing
this, investorswillingness to borrow and bankswillingness to lend is likely to be limited
when the stock market volatility and crash risk are high. In line with the idea that equity
market valuations a¤ect banksability to lend, we present evidence in the Appendix that
the Japanese nancial sector stock market index varies closely with the Japanese banks
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interbank lending to foreign banks, whose interbank borrowing in turn is tied to carry trades
according to Hattori and Shin (2009).1
Whatever the relative role of the various channels through which equity market risks
in Japan a¤ect the Japanese investors or other investors currency market trading, our
results suggest that the e¤ects are signicant. For instance, during our sample period, from
year 2000 to 2011, changes in our estimates of the Japanese equity market volatility and
crash risk explain 27% of the changes in the non-commercial tradersnet futures positions in
Australian dollar and Japanese yen at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
in the US. These measures can also explain 42% of monthly carry trade returns, and 64%
of the monthly currency volatility against USD for the average currency in our sample.2
Notably, our measures of funding risk in yen explain these currency market phenomena
signicantly better than measures of funding conditions and funding risk in the US, such as
the TED spread and the VIX index, that have been used to explain similar currency market
phenomena e.g. in Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen (2009). Our results thus complement
the ndings in Hattori and Shin (2009), who also demonstrate the importance of Japan
for the global currency markets by showing how the conditions in the Japanese interbank
market translate into large currency ows in and out of Japan in connection to currency
carry trading.
1The idea that the investorsfunding constraints a¤ect asset pricing was rst presented in Shleifer and
Vishny (1997). See also Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). Adrian,
Etula, and Muir (2013) show the importance of broker-dealersleverage in US (a measure of their funding
constraints) in explaining the US stock and bond returns.
2Our sample consists from ten industrialized countries. When estimating the carry trade returns, we look
at the currency carry trades that invest in one to ve currencies with the highest interest rates, and borrow
in the one to ve currencies with the lowest interest rates. In addition, we study separately the most common
carry trade according to popular press: borrowing the Japanese yen and investing in the Australian dollar.
As is well documented (see e.g. Bekaert, 1996; Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski and Rebelo, 2011), such
currency carry trades have historically provided good returns to investors due to the failure of the uncovered
interest rate parity.
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We have several additional results that highlight the importance of the Japanese nancial
market conditions on global nancial markets. We show for instance that the same equity
market risks in Japan can explain a large fraction of the time variation in the monthly
currency correlations between carry trade investment and funding currencies (e.g. 23% of the
time variation in the correlation between Australian dollar and Japanese yen). In addition,
our measures of funding risk can explain skewness in currency returns (particularly for the
carry trade investment currencies), as well as currency crash risk. Moreover we show that it
is really the Japanese equity market risks that matter, not the equity market risk in general.
We stress this result by showing that the equity market risks in Japan (or even in another
funding country, Switzerland) make the same measures for US redundant, in regressions
explaining carry trade returns.
Our empirical results bridge several earlier ndings presented in the literature related to
currency carry trade returns and currency market volatility, by showing linkages between
funding conditions (as discussed in Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen, 2009) for currency
speculators, the volatility in the currency market (as described e.g. in Menkho¤ et al.,
2012), and currency crash risk (see e.g. Jurek, 2009; Ichiue and Koyama, 2011). Our
research provides support for those earlier papers, which argue that the historical returns on
currency carry trading reect limited speculative capital, such as Jylhä and Suominen (2011)
and Barroso and Santa-Clara (2012). Furthermore, our results complement the literature
linking equity and foreign exchange markets (see for instance Lettau, Maggiori, and Weber,
2013; Hau and Rey, 2005; Korajczyk and Viallet, 1992).
On a broader scope, our paper is related to previous work on the importance of "peso
problems" for understanding abnormal returns. Even if market crashes fail to materialize
in-sample, it is possible to use forward-looking option prices to estimate implied risk in the
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underlying security and thus measure investorsexpectations of such events. Along these
lines, Santa-Clara and Yan (2010) use S&P500 options to estimate US equity market implied
risk, and they nd support for a peso problemexplanation of the equity premium puzzle.
Here we show that these measures of implied risk in the equity market of a carry trade
funding-currency country can explain carry trade returns, therefore supporting a risk-based
explanation also for the forward premium puzzle.
To provide structure for our empirical investigation, we set up a stylized model that ex-
tends the currency carry trade model presented in Jylhä and Suominen (2011). In our model
there are two countries, whose nominal xed income securities o¤er di¤erent returns due to
di¤erences in the two countriesinvestorsper capita ination risk. When the correlation be-
tween the two countriesination risk is high and the number of investors that can engage in
international xed income transactions is small, speculators engage in carry trading. In our
model, similarly as in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Gromb and Vayanos (2002),
speculators face funding constraints. In addition, we assume that there is time variation
in the level of funding constraints, causing funding risk. Our model is consistent with the
empirical ndings discussed above.
Our paper makes two main contributions to the literature. First, it shows how the
nancial market conditions in a single carry trade short currency can have a signicant
impact on the global currency markets. Given our results, models that insist on homogenous
global investors, or look at currency market phenomena only from a US perspective can only
have limited success in empirically explaining the currency market phenomena. Our second
contribution is to study theoretically the e¤ects of funding risk on carry trade countries
exchange rates, currency return correlations and skewness.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I we present our stylized model.
Section II describes the data and Section III discusses the estimation of currency carry trade
returns and funding risk. In Section IV we present our empirical ndings, while Section V
concludes the paper.
I. The Model
A. Setup
Our model builds upon Jylhä and Suominen (2011). We assume that there are two countries
fi; jg, each with N citizens where N is normalized to one. The citizens produce and consume
a single commodity and use money in the production of this commodity. We also assume
that country i0s production function generates fi (mi;t) goods in period t + 1, where mi;t
denotes agents real money holdings of country is currency in period t. The production
function takes the logarithmic form fi (mi;t) = Ai;t ln(mi;t), where Ai;t denotes the stochastic
marginal productivity, known to the agents at time t. The marginal productivity, in turn,
follows an autoregressive process of the AR (1) form:
Ai;t = Ai   A
 
Ai;t 1   Ai

+ i;t; (1)
where Ai and A are positive constants and i  N
 
0; 2Ai

.
The purchasing power of country is money in period t is denoted by i;t, so that Mi
units of country is currency have a real purchasing power of mi;t = Mii;t. Agents choose
their optimal real money holdings given information available at time t, thus endogenously
determining the purchasing power i;t.
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Besides money, there are two other storage technologies in each country. First there is a
risk-free asset with real return rf in perfectly elastic supply. We refer to the risk-free asset
also as "safe currency". Second, there is a one-period default-free zero coupon bond, sold at
a real market price pi;t, that pays one unit of country is nominal currency at time t+1. The
risk in this asset comes from the uncertain purchasing power of money in period t+ 1, i;t+1.
The expected real return to the country is bonds is denoted by ri = Eti;t+1=pi;t  1, where
Et refers to the expectation operator conditional on time t information. Both countriesrisky
assets are in zero net supply. As Fama and Farber (1979), we assume that all consumers
rst hedge their money holdings in the bond market, and only then look at their bond
investments. In this case, the e¤ective supply of bonds, denoted in country is currency, is
country is money supply M i.
We assume overlapping generations of myopic agents, who live for two periods, invest
when they are young and consume when they are old. Before dying, they sell their money
holdings to the next generation of agents. Period t investors value their next period con-
sumption ct+1 using a CARA-utility function, u (ct+1) =  Ete act+1, where a denotes risk
aversion. Furthermore, let us denote by bi;t the quantity of country is nominal zero coupon
bonds, with a face value of one, that an agent purchases (or sells) in period t (in addition
to his short position in country is bonds, that comes from hedging his currency holdings).
Similarly, let bj;t refer to purchases of country js bonds.
We assume that the nancial markets are segmented: a fraction (1  ki) > 0 of country
is investors have prohibitively high transaction costs of investing abroad, i.e. to hold money
or interest bearing securities in a foreign currency. Fraction ki of country is investors,
on the other hand, are unrestricted. We call the restricted investors domestic investors
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and the unrestricted ones speculators.3 To keep the model parsimonious, in contrast to
Jylhä and Suominen (2011), we take the number of speculators as given.4 Our second point
of departure from Jylhä and Suominen (2011) is to assume that investors face borrowing
constraints, as in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Gromb and Vayanos (2002). The
main innovation in our model, however, is to assume time variation in the severity of the
borrowing constraints. We assume that the borrowing constraint for country i bonds at time
t is given by bi;t   hi;t, with hi;t > 0. Furthermore, evaluated at time t, the next periods
borrowing constraint is random:
hi;t+1 = h  h
 
hi;t   h

+ i;t+1, (2)
where h and h are positive constants and i;t  N (0; 2h). For simplicity, we assume that i;t
is independent of i;t. Without loss of generality, we assume A = h = . Given condition
(2), in our model the investors face not only funding constraints, but also funding risk. In
contrast to the nancial markets, there are no barriers in the product market.
Therefore, assuming that period t investors are endowed with a real wealth wt at the
beginning of period t, country is speculators at time t maximize:
Max
mi;t;bi;t;bj;t
  Ete act+1 s.t. (3)
ct+1 =

wt  mi;t + pi;tmi;t
i;t

(1 + rf ) + fi (mi;t) +
P
n=i;j
bn;t (n;t+1   pn;t (1 + rf ))
bi;t   hi;t, bj;t   hj;t.
3The domestic investorstransaction costs from investing abroad can also be behavioral.
4Jylhä and Suominen (2011) study a model where the number of speculators is endogenous and assume
that investors must pay a fee  > 0 to obtain access to international money markets.
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The domestic investors in country i, in turn, solve the following optimization problem:
Max
mi;t;bi;t
  Ete act+1 s.t. (4)
ct+1 =

wt  mi;t + pi;tmi;t
i;t

(1 + rf ) + fi (mi;t) + bi;t (i;t+1   pi;t (1 + rf ))
bi;t   hi;t.
Equilibrium prevails when each agents action maximizes his expected utility and markets
clear. Finally, note that country is citizens do not benet from country js currency in their
production activities.
B. The Equilibrium
B.1. Equilibrium Conditions
Since there are no restrictions in the product market, purchasing power parity (PPP) implies
that the period t exchange rate (at which country js currency can be exchanged to country
is currency) is given by Sj;it = j;t=i;t. We will for the moment assume that the borrowing
constraints do not bind for the domestic investors. We later verify this assumption. Now,
dene Mdi;t as the per capita supply of country is zero coupon bonds that must, in equi-
librium, be purchased by the domestic investors of country i. We use a superscript d to
denote a domestic investor and a superscript s to denote a speculator. In other words, if the
speculators hold kib
s;i
i;t + kjb
s;j
i;t units of country is bonds (where the sub-index i in b
s;j
i;t refers
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to the country in whose currency the investment is made and the superscript j refers to the
country where speculator s is originally from), we dene Mdi;t as:
Mdi;t =
M i   kibs;ii;t   kjbs;ji;t
1  ki . (5)
We will now assume (and verify later) that i;t and j;t are jointly normally distributed
with means k and variances 2k, where k 2 fi; jg. Taking expectations and the rst order
condition of (4) with respect to domestic investorsbond holdings bdi;t, and using the market
clearing condition bdi;t = M
d
i;t, we obtain that the price of the zero coupon bond, pi;t, in
country i at time t is:
pi;t (1 + rf ) = Eti;t+1   a2iMdi;t, (6)
where 2i  var (i;t+1) denotes the variance of the purchasing power of country is currency
(conditional on time t information). This implies that the Sharpe ratio for the real returns
on country is bonds is:
SRi;t =
ri;t   rf
i=pi;t
= aiM
d
i;t. (7)
These results show that the Sharpe ratio on bond investments is increasing in the para-
meter of risk aversion a, ination risk i, and the per capita supply of bonds in the domestic
market Mdi;t. In the case of an autarky, where ki and kj are zero, M
d
i;t = M i, where M i is
the local money supply. In such perfectly segmented markets, the Sharpe ratio for bonds is
higher in the country with the higher per capita ination risk, M ii. Let us denote by H
the country with the higher per capita ination risk and by L the country with the lower
per capita ination risk. In the case of autarkies, the higher Sharpe ratio in country H, as
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compared to country L, is necessary to attract su¢ cient investment into the risky bonds of
country H, clearing the market despite the higher amount of risk being sold.
Let us now look at the speculatorsproblem. Taking the rst order condition of (3) with
respect to the speculatorsinvestment into country is bonds, bsi;t, implies:
bsi;t =
Eti;t+1   pi;t (1 + rf )  bsj;taij + i;t=a
a2i
, (8)
where   corrt (i;t+1; j;t+1) equals the correlation between the two countriespurchasing
power, and  denotes the Lagrangian multiplier, so that i;t  0 and i;t
 
bsi;t + hi;t

= 0.
Again, the i and j sub-indices refer to the currency in which the investment is made. There is
no superscript for countries, as the speculators from both countries make similar investments.
Using (5) and (6) in (8), we can now solve for the equilibrium bond holdings.
Next, recall that fi (mi;t) = Ai;t ln(mi;t). Taking the rst order condition of (3) and (4)
with respect to mi;t and, using it together with condition (6), implies:
Eti;t+1 = (1 + rf ) i;t   Ai;t
M i
+ a2iM
d
i;t. (9)
From conditions (6) and (9), the exchange rate can now be stated as a function of the
two countries zero-coupon bond prices:
Sj;it =
j;t
i;t
=
pj;tM iM j (1 + rf ) + Aj;tM i
pi;tM iM j (1 + rf ) + Ai;tM j
. (10)
B.2. The Equilibrium
The higher Sharpe ratio in country Hs bonds implies that speculators are always long in
these bonds. Therefore the borrowing constraint is potentially binding only for country L
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bonds. We next characterize our economy in two states: 1) the borrowing constraints do
not bind and 2) the speculatorsborrowing constraint in country L is binding. In the region
where the funding constraints bind occasionally we solve the model using numerical methods.
Case 1: Borrowing constraint is not binding The equilibrium is the same as in Jylhä
and Suominen (2011).5 Solving the set of equations (5), (6), and (8) with i;t = 0, we obtain
that in equilibrium all speculators hold identical portfolios:
bs;Ui =
M ii (1 + ki) M jj (1  ki)
i [(1  2) (1 + kikj) + (1 + 2) (ki + kj)] (11)
of country is bonds, while the domestic investors hold:
bd;Ui = M
d;U
i =
M ii (1 + ki   2 + 2kj) +M jj (ki + kj)
i [(1  2) (1 + kikj) + (1 + 2) (ki + kj)] (12)
of such bonds. The superscript U refers to the unconstrained equilibrium. Using (12) in
equations (6) and (7) gives us an easy characterization of the equilibrium bond prices and
Sharpe ratios in our economy.
Note from (12) that, in both countries, the supply of bonds that domestic investors
hold is strictly positive (therefore verifying our earlier assumption that domestic investors
are long in bonds) and implying also positive Sharpe ratios. Note also from (11) that, in
equilibrium, the speculators are indeed always long in country Hs bonds. Moreover, if  is
high enough, i.e.,  >  with    MLL =  MHH, and kL is small enough, i.e., kL < kL
with kL 
 
MHH MLL

=
 
MHH+MLL

, the speculators are short the country
5This unconstrained equilibrium is stable for su¢ ciently high h and su¢ ciently small h. In this region,
the borrowing constraint becomes binding only if a sudden funding crash occurs, i.e. there is a sharp decline
in hL. Since the probability of this tail event can be made arbitrarily small, we follow the usual practice in
the literature and neglect it in the solution of case 1.
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L bonds, thus engaging in a carry trade. For the remainder of the paper, we will assume
 >  and kL < kL.
Case 2: Borrowing constraint in country L is binding For su¢ ciently low h and
su¢ ciently low h, it is easy to show that equations (5), (6), and (8) imply a constrained
equilibrium where the speculatorsborrowing constraint in country L is binding and specu-
lators still enter into a carry trade.6 In such an equilibrium, using conditions (9) and (8) we
have:
bs;CL;t =  hL;t, (13)
bs;CH;t =
MH
1 + kL
+
(1  kH) L
(1 + kL)H
hL;t,
which, together with condition (6), imply:
(1 + rf ) pL;t = EtL;t+1   a2L

ML + (kL + kH)hL;t
1  kL

, (14)
(1 + rf ) pH;t = EtH;t+1   a2H

MH
1 + kL
  (kL + kH) L
H (1 + kL)
hL;t

.
The superscript C refers to the constrained equilibrium. From condition (13), we can see
that stricter funding constraints (lower hL) lead to a smaller bsH and larger (i.e. smaller
in absolute value) bsL. Moreover, in such an equilibrium, the bond investments of domestic
investors bdL and b
d
H remain positive.
Case 3: Borrowing constraint in country L is occasionaly binding In solving the
model for cases 1 and 2, we have to assume that either the borrowing constraint is always
6In this region, the borrowing constraint can be made binding with probability close to 1. As above, we
neglect tail events in solving for the constrained equilibrium.
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binding, or it is never binding. Under Normal distribution for the borrowing constraint
and under suitable parameters for the model, these assumptions can hold with a probability
arbitrarily close to one. For other parameter selections, the assumption that borrowing
constraints always hold or never hold are too stringent to even approximately characterize
the equilibrium. In those cases, we must resort to numerical solutions for the model. In the
Appendix B we derive six equilibrium conditions, that allow us to numerically solve for the
equilibrium.
C. Model Predictions
In this subsection, we turn to the model implications, in terms of the e¤ect of funding
conditions and funding risk on exchange rates and speculatorsactivity.
C.1. Exchange Rate Volatility and Correlations
Hypothesis 1: When the borrowing constraint in the carry trade funding cur-
rency is binding, exchange rate volatility (relative to the safe currency) is higher
for both risky currencies, compared to the region where the borrowing constraint
is not binding. In addition, higher funding risk, h, increases currency volatility.
Given the structure of the shocks in the model, we conjecture and verify that the purchasing
power  also follows an auto-regressive process and thus its conditional expectation depends
on the current value according to Eti;t+1 = i ;i (i;t   i), with i constant. Using con-
dition (9), we can therefore determine i and ;i as functions of the underlying parameters.
In the case of the non-binding borrowing constraint, this implies:
Ui;t = 
U
i +
Ai;t   Ai
M i (1 + rf + )
, (15)
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where U denotes the unconstrained equilibrium, and
Ui =
Ai
rfM i
  aM
d;U
i (
2
i )
U
rf
: (16)
Given that condition (9) also holds for both countries in the case where the constraints
are binding, similar arguments yield:
CL;t = 
C
L +
AL;t   AL
ML (1 + rf + )
  a (
2
L)
C
(kL + kH)
 
hL;t   h

(1  kL) (1 + rf + ) , (17)
CH;t = 
C
H +
AH;t   AH
MH (1 + rf + )
+
aCL
C
H
C (kL + kH)
 
hL;t   h

(1 + kL) (1 + rf + )
,
where:
CL =
AL
rfML
 
aE

Md;CL;t

(2L)
C
rf
=
AL
rfML
  a (
2
L)
C 
ML + (kL + kH)h

rf (1  kL) , (18)
CH =
AH
rfMH
 
aE

Md;CH;t

(2H)
C
rf
=
AH
rfMH
+
aCL
C
H
C (kL + kH)h
rf (1 + kL)
  a (
2
H)
C
MH
rf (1 + kL)
.
Again C denotes the constrained equilibrium. Using these conditions for the purchasing
power, we can calculate the corresponding variances (conditional on time t information) for
the non-binding case:
V art
 
Ui;t+1
   2i U = 2Ai
M i (1 + rf + )
2 , (19)
15
and for the binding case:
V art
 
CL;t+1
   2LC =  2LU +
 
a (kL + kH)h (
2
L)
C
(1  kL) (1 + rf + )
!2
>
 
2L
U
, (20)
V art
 
CH;t+1
   2HC =  2HU + aCLCHC (kL + kH)h(1 + kL) (1 + rf + )
2
>
 
2H
U
.
Equation (20) shows that the volatilities of the two countriespurchasing power and,
given this, also the volatilities of their exchange rates with respect to the risk-free asset, are
higher in the constrained case. In addition, they increase with h.7
Hypothesis 2: When the borrowing constraint is binding, the correlation between
the purchasing powers in carry-long and -short countries is lower. In addition,
higher funding risk, h, decreases this correlation. Using conditions (15) and (17)
above, we can calculate how the correlation between the two countriespurchasing power
varies between the unconstrained and constrained equilibria and, in the latter case, how it
varies with funding risk. For the unconstrained equilibrium, we have:
Corrt
 
Ui;t+1; 
U
j;t+1
  U = Ai;Aj
AiAj
= A, (21)
while, for the constrained equilibria, conditions (17) and (18) imply that:
Corrt
 
Ci;t+1; 
C
j;t+1
  C = U
CL
C
H
UL
U
H

1 +
(aCL (kL+kH)h)
2
(1 k2L)(1+rf+)
2
 < U . (22)
7Note that condition (20) implies that there can exist two di¤erent constrained equilibria with di¤erent
volatilities (and, in both cases, Ci is higher than 
U
i ).
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Thus, the correlation between carry-long and -short currencies - where each currency is
measured vis-a-vis the risk-free asset - is lower when borrowing constraints are binding.
Moreover condition (22), along with condition (20), shows that C is decreasing in funding
risk, 2h. The lower correlation between the carry trade long and the carry trade short
currencies, in the region where the funding constraints bind, is caused by the time variation
in the severity of the funding constraints. Whenever the funding constraints tighten, the
speculators unwind their carry trade positions, buying carry trade short currencies and selling
carry trade long currencies, thus pushing the two currencies in opposite directions. Similarly,
when the funding conditions are relaxed, they buy the carry trade long currencies and short
the carry trade short currencies, again pushing the currencies in opposite directions.
C.2. Skewness and Currency Crashes
Hypothesis 3: Tightening of funding conditions is associated with exchange rate
skewness and currency crashes To demonstrate what happens as the funding con-
straints become tighter, we must resort to the numerical solution of the model. The devel-
opment of the two currencies expected exchange rates to the safe currency are depicted in
Figure 1 for the special case where  equals zero.
[Figure 1 here]
Our model makes predictions on currency skewness. In the region where the constraints
are not binding, the exchange rate uctuations are smaller, given (20), therefore leading to
skewness in currency returns. In addition, our numerical solutions, as the one presented in
Figure 1, suggest that the sign of the skewness for the investment currencies is negative,
while the sign of the skewness for the funding currencies is likely to be positive.
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Under some parameter values, our simulations predict that there would be a drop in the
value of both of the risky currencies (currency crash) when the funding constraints start
binding. To understand the possibility of such a currency crash, it is useful to compare
the two equilibria where the funding constraints either always bind, or never bind. Note
that, from the proof to Hypothesis 1, the currency variances are higher in the constrained
equilibrium. Given Equations (16) and (18), other things equal, this alone should lead to a
decline in the values of the purchasing power of both currencies (i.e., a currency crash) when
the economy switches from a region where the funding constraints do not bind to a region
where they bind. In our model, the currencies price variability is higher in the constrained
equilibrium, because there is constant portfolio rebalancing by the speculators in response
to changes in the borrowing constraints. Additional desire for portfolio rebalancing when
the borrowing constraint starts binding comes from a change in the correlation between the
two risky currencies implied by (22).
C.3. Speculative Activity and Currency Carry Trade Returns
Hypothesis 4: The level of the funding constraints and funding risk a¤ect spec-
ulatorspositions It is clear from equations (13) that the level of funding constraints in
country L, hL, directly a¤ects the amount of country L bonds that speculators can short.
In addition, it a¤ects the amount of speculators investment in country H. Moreover, in
the region where the constraint is binding, conditions (13) and (22) imply that the funding
risk, h, reduces speculative investment in currency H, therefore leading to unwinding of
long-side carry trades. Both e¤ects conrm hypothesis 4.
18
Hypothesis 5: The level of the funding constraints and funding risk a¤ect carry
trade returns From condition (17) we see that, in the region where the funding constraints
bind, decreases in hL (i.e., tightening of the funding constraints) lead to an increase in
currency L and a decrease in currency H, thus a¤ecting adversely carry trade returns.
Furthermore, from (17) and (22) we can see that increases in funding risk, h, lead to
disproportionate decreases in the values of both risky currencies, also a¤ecting currency
carry trade returns.
II. The Data
A. Currency Data
Exchange rate data for the period between January 2000 and December 2011 is collected from
Reuters (WM/R) at Datastream. It includes daily spot rates, as well as 1-month forward
rates, and all quotes are expressed as foreign currency units (FCU) per USD. Following
Lustig et al. (2011) or Menkho¤ et al. (2012), we focus on a sample of ten developed
countries: Australian dollar (AUD), Canadian dollar (CAD), Danish krone (DKK), Euro
(EUR), Japanese yen (JPY), New Zealand dollar (NZD), Norwegian krone (NOK), Swedish
krona (SEK), Swiss franc (CHF) and UK pound (GBP).
As a proxy for carry trade activity, we follow Brunnermeier et al. (2009) and use the
futures position data from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), available
at a weekly frequency.
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B. Stock Market Options Data
For the estimation of funding risk, we use data on European options of stock market indices
from four di¤erent countries - US, Australia, Japan and Switzerland. For the US, we use
data on S&P 500 index options traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE);
for Australia, data on S&P/ASX 200 index options traded on Australian Stock Exchange
(ASX); for Japan, data on Nikkei 225 index options traded on Osaka Securities Exchange
(OSA); and, for Switzerland, data on SMI 50 index options traded on Eurex (EUX). US
and Japanese samples start in January 2000, while the series for Australia and Switzerland
start in February and July 2001, respectively. All options are traded in local currency and
we use end-of-day data obtained from Thomson Reuters. The stock market indices and
LIBOR interest rates for di¤erent maturities (from 1 week to 1 year) are also obtained from
Datastream.
Starting with daily data on the di¤erent stock index options, we rst apply a similar
ltering process as Santa-Clara and Yan (2010). We drop contracts with missing data;
maturity is restricted to be longer than 10 days and shorter than 1 year; we keep only
options with moneyness (i.e. stock price divided by the strike price) between 0.85 and
1.15; cases with open interest of fewer than 100 contracts are excluded (except for ASX200
options, for which this information is mostly non-available); we use only put options and
apply option parity to obtain the corresponding call prices; contracts that have too low prices
are excluded8; cases that imply option mispricing (i.e. violation of boundary conditions) are
also dropped. For the remaining sample, we calculate Black-Scholes implied volatilities and
delete those contracts for which this value cannot be determined. In Appendix, Table A.1
8Following Santa-Clara and Yan (2010), the cuto¤ price is 0:125 USD for S&P500. In similar fashion, we
choose 12:5 Yen for Nikkei225, 0:1875 AUD for ASX200 and 0:125 SWF for SMI50.
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shows the mean implied volatilities, as well as the numbers of option contracts for each
market.
III. Modeling Carry Trade Returns and Funding Risk
In this section, we rst present the carry trade strategy and associated returns for di¤erent
portfolio constructions. Second, we present our proxies for funding risk.
A. The Returns to Currency Carry Trade
The carry trade investor borrows in low interest rate currencies and invests in high interest
rate currencies, thus making positive expected returns due to the failure of the uncovered
interest rate parity. The carry trade can also be implemented using forward exchange rate
contracts (see for example Galati et al., 2007). Following this latter approach, we calculate
monthly returns using one-month forward rates. We rst sort currencies according to their
forward discounts9, and then borrow (invest in) the currency with the smallest (largest) for-
ward discount. We denote this long-short strategy by HmL (High-minus-Low). During our
sample period, Japanese yen and Swiss franc were typically considered the standard "funding
currencies", while Australian and New Zealand dollars were the two major "investment cur-
rencies". Therefore a very popular strategy among investors was to short the Japanese yen
and go long the Australian dollar. We consider this strategy, which we denote by AUmJP
(Australian dollar minus Japanese yen), and present its return over time on Figure 2.
[Figure 2 here]
9The forward discount is dened as FD = fw=e  1, where e is the spot exchange rate (denominated in
FCUs per USD) and fw is the forward exchange rate.
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For robustness purposes, we also consider two alternative strategies: going long (short)
in the three currencies with the three largest (smallest) forward discounts (HmL3); going
long (short) in the ve currencies with the ve largest (smallest) forward discounts (HmL5).
Table I shows the summary statistics of the monthly returns on these carry trade port-
folios. Compared to our estimates, Menkho¤ et al. (2012) report a higher average return
for the period covering December 1983 to August 2009. This di¤erence is consistent with
the ndings of Jylhä and Suominen (2011), who nd that carry trade returns have decreased
over time.
[Table I here]
B. Estimating Funding Risk
B.1. Motivation
We proxy for the carry trade funding risk in any given countrys currency by the options
implied volatility and crash risk in that countrys stock market. More specically, we estimate
the optionsimplied stock market volatility and jump intensity for selected countriesstock
markets using data on the respective marketsequity index options. As we argued in the
Introduction, there are several reasons to believe that these measures reect funding risks
for the local investors speculating in the international currency markets, as well as for the
international investors who borrow in the local currency. First, local equity is commonly
used as a collateral when local investors fund their currency carry trades. Hence local equity
market risks pose risks in the amount of collateral that local investors can pledge in the
future. Second, local equity market risks cause risks in the banksability to lend: banks in
many countries (for instance in Japan) are large investors in the local equity market. Hence
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changes in local equity market valuations directly a¤ect the bankscapital requirements and
lending capacity. Furthermore, irrespective of the former, as Adrian and Shin (2010) argue,
in a nancial system where balance sheets are continuously marked to market, reductions in
banksown equity market valuation a¤ect their ability to lend. Through these channels, risks
in the local equity market translate to funding risks to all investors who rely on funding from
the local nancial intermediaries. The funding risks can be largely currency-specic, since
stresses on the local banksbalance sheets can cause shortage of funding especially in the local
currency (see also McGuire and von Peter, 2009). As Japanese yen is the most signicant
funding currency in carry trades, and carry trading is popular among the Japanese retail
investors, we focus on the functioning of the Japanese nancial markets and the associated
potential shortages of yen funding.
There exists some evidence that the local nancing conditions in Japan a¤ect interna-
tional bankscustomers carry trading. Hattori and Shin (2009) present evidence that there
is signicant time variation in the availability of yen funding that is closely connected to
the popularity of the yen carry trade. Following Hattori and Shin (2009), we also show for
our sample period (in Appendix A) that there is signicant comovement between the net
interbank assets of foreign banks of Japan (i.e., the di¤erence in the interbank lending and
borrowing by foreign banks in Japan), their net intero¢ ce accounts (i.e., the net liabilities
of the parent o¢ ces due to their foreign-related o¢ ces), and carry trade activity. First,
there is a strongly negative correlation,  65:10%, between the net interbank assets and the
net intero¢ ce accounts of foreign banks in Japan (see Figure A.1). As Hattori and Shin
(2009), we interpret this to be evidence that the foreign banks channel yen funding out of
Japan through their local subsidiaries. To show further support for the idea that funding
conditions in Japan a¤ect the carry trade activity of the foreign banks, and their customers,
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we show that these foreign banksnet intero¢ ce accounts are closely related to the carry
trade activity in Japanese yen futures (see Figure A.2). Our evidence therefore suggests
that, in times when the carry trade positions are actively taken and speculators short the
yen futures in the US, the foreign bankssubsidiaries simultaneously increase their borrowing
in the Japanese interbank market, and lend out yen to their parent companies. Moreover,
and in line with the arguments presented in Adrian and Shin (2010), that the market value
of the local banksequity a¤ects their ability to lend out money, we nd a striking relation
between the equity prices of Japanese nancial institutions and their yen lending to foreign
nancial institutions, as depicted in Figure A.3. This is evidence that the foreign banks
ability to obtain yen funding depends on the health of the Japanese banks, and in particular
on their equity market valuations.
B.2. Our Measure of Funding Risk
We use index option data to estimate stock market risk (both di¤usion and jump components)
as it is perceived ex ante by investors. Our goal is to relate these measures, estimated for
both long and short carry countries, with exchange rate dynamics and speculatorsactivity.
For this purpose, we consider four markets: the US (the benchmark currency), Australia (a
typical investing currency, in which investors go long)10, as well as Japan and Switzerland
(the typical funding currencies, commonly shorted by speculators). However, in most of
our empirical analysis, we focus on the funding risk in Japan, as the Japanese Yen was the
most important funding currency during our sample period.
We follow Santa-Clara and Yan (2010) and model stochastic volatility as a Brownian
motion and the jump risk as a Poisson process, which is assumed to have stochastic intensity.
10Another natural candidate for a long currency would be New Zealand. However data on stock index
options for this country is not available, thus restricting our sample choice.
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In particular, for each of the four countries above, the dynamics of the stock market index
S is modeled as follows:
dS =
 
r +   Q

Sdt+ Y SdWS +QSdH (23)
dY = (Y + Y Y ) dt+ Y dWY
dZ = (Z + ZZ) dt+ ZdWZ
ln (1 +Q)  N

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 
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Here r is the constant risk-free interest rate. The di¤usive variance of the stock return
is  = Y 2. H is a Poisson process, such that Pr (dH = 1) = dt, where the stochastic
arrival intensity is given by  = Z2. Moreover, both Z and Y follow Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
processes, with long-run means of Y =Y and Z=Z , mean-reversion speeds of Y and Z ,
and volatilities given by Y and Z respectively.11 Q is the percentage jump size, which is
assumed to follow an independent log-normal distribution. The drift on the stock market
index is adjusted for the average jump size with the term Q, and  is the risk premium
on the stock market index. WS, WY , and WZ are Brownian motions and they are allowed
to be interdependent according to a constant correlation matrix .
Santa-Clara and Yan (2010) show that, for a representative investor who has wealth
W and allocates it entirely to the stock market, the risk premium  can be expressed as a
function of Y and Z. Under this risk-adjusted probability measure, the inverse Fourier trans-
formation of a function of the state variables is used to obtain the price P = f (S; Y; Z;K;T )
of a European call option with strike price K and maturity date T (e.g. Lewis, 2000).
11Applying Itos lemma, one can nd the processes for  and . The drift and covariance terms will not
be linear in the state variables, making it a linear-quadratic jump-di¤usion model.
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We apply Santa-Clara and Yan (2010) quasi-maximum likelihood approach12 and esti-
mate the model for each country every week, using data for the stock index and four put
option contracts fSt; P 1t ; P 2t ; P 3t ; P 4t g.13 P 1t and P 2t are assumed to be observed without error
and used to imply the state variables Yt and Zt. Given the state variables, we calculate the
model-based option prices for the other two option contracts and use them to compute the
corresponding Black-Scholes implied volatilities. We also compute the Black-Scholes implied
volatilities based on the observed market prices P 3t and P
4
t . Therefore P
3
t and P
4
t are used
to calculate the measurement errors, dened as the di¤erence between the model-based and
the market-based implied volatilties. Table II reports summary statistics for the implied
time series of di¤usive volatility
p
 and jump intensity , for the two funding currencies,
Australia, and the US.
[Table II here]
Our US estimates are consistent with those obtained by Santa-Clara and Yan (2010), but
we do nd higher average volatility most likely due to the nancial crisis period. Moreover,
although volatility and jump intensity are correlated within and across countries, they still
display di¤erent behavior over time, as illustrated by Figure 3.
[Figure 3 here]
12The estimation approach is described in detail in their paper, so we omit the details here. We also thank
the authors for kindly making their estimation code available.
13P 1t and P
2
t have the shortest maturity (greater than 15 days and as close as possible to 30 days), P
3
t
and P 4t have the second shortest maturity (greater than 45 days and as close as possible to 60 days). P
1
t
and P 3t are closest to at-the-money, while P
2
t and P
4
t are closest to moneyness of 1:05.
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IV. Empirical Findings
We now turn to testing the ve hypotheses regarding the relation between funding risk,
exchange rates, and speculatorsactivity. Given the importance of Japanese nancial con-
ditions to carry trade funding liquidity discussed above, we use the volatility and jump
intensity estimated from stock options in Japan as our measures of funding risk. As the next
sections will show, these measures perform striking well in explaining currency dynamics,
speculatorsactivity, and carry trade returns. Moreover they outperform common measures
of funding risk used in the literature, such as the TED spread. They also prove robust to
the inclusion of a simple index of nancial sector equity performance in Japan. Finally, very
similar results are obtained with the measures calculated from stock options in Switzerland,
therefore conrming the important role of the low-yield currencies.14
A. Explaining FX Volatility and Correlations with Funding Risk
Hypotheses 1 and 2 in Section I.C predict that increased funding risk leads to higher vari-
ability in both funding and investing currencies, as well as to a lower correlation between
carry-short and carry-long currencies.
To test Hypothesis 1, we use a monthly measure of exchange rate volatility. For each
currency, we calculate the standard deviation of daily currency returns (i.e. the symmetric
of daily exchange rate changes against the USD) over the last month. The monthly mea-
sure of currency volatility, denoted by FX, is calculated as the average of the individual
standard deviations. We then regress the average volatility, FX, on the funding risk in
Japan, measured as the (monthly average) of the volatility and jump likelihood.15 To adjust
14The unreported results for Switzerland are available upon request.
15We also tried two alternative specications: (i) using daily data on exchange rates, we calculated volatility
over the previous week and then performed weekly regressions of FX on funding risk; (ii) again using daily
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for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the monthly regression residuals, we report
Newey-West standard errors. Table III presents the results. The estimated coe¢ cients are
positive, conrming that currency volatility is increasing in funding risk.
[Table III here]
As Table III shows, the volatility and crash risk in the Japanese stock market alone
explain, on average, a staggering 64% of monthly currency volatility. Table III also includes
alternative measures of funding risk commonly used in the literature. In particular we
consider the TED spread (measured as the di¤erence between the 3-months LIBOR dollar
rate and the 3-months T-Bill rate) and we nd that it performs signicantly worse than the
Japanese crash risk. As a robustness test, and motivated by the empirical evidence discussed
in subsection B.1, we also include the Japanese nancial sector stock index in the regression.
The nancial sector equity prices in Japan can explain 15% of the currency volatility and
they remain statistically signicant in all regression specications. Hypothesis 1 is therefore
validated in the data.
Hypothesis 2 is also conrmed by our empirical results. In order to show it, we calcu-
late the correlation coe¢ cient between our investing (or long) currency, Australian dollar,
and our funding (or short) currency, Japanese yen. As above, the correlation is calculated
monthly (using daily data over the previous month) and we then regress it on our monthly
average measures of funding risk. As can be seen from Table IV, the estimated coe¢ cient
for crash risk is negative and the corresponding adjusted R2 is 23%, conrming our hypoth-
esis that the correlation between investing and funding currencies decreases when funding
conditions tighten.
data, we calculated volatility over the previous month, and then performed rolling weekly regressions. All
three alternatives deliver similar conclusions, but the specication shown is preferred as it is less noisy than
(i) and avoids potential issues with the overlapping data used in (ii).
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[Table IV here]
B. Explaining Currency Crashes and Skewness with Funding Risk
The cross-sectional di¤erences in currency skewness are well-known in the literature. Con-
sistent with previous work, we also nd that average skewness is positive and highest for
Japanese yen (the main carry trade funding currency), while negative and lowest for Aus-
tralian and New Zealand dollars (the main carry trade investing currencies).
In our model, if the funding constraints do not bind, the currency variability is smaller.
When funding constraints start binding, there is potentially rst a currency crash in both
the funding and investment currencies. Any further tightening of funding constraints, in
turn, leads to further depreciation of the investment currencies but an appreciation of the
funding currencies. Given these e¤ects, our model predicts that the currency returns are
negatively skewed for the investment currencies, but not necessarily so for the funding cur-
rencies. Therefore, let us investigate if countriesdi¤erent exposures to funding risk help
to explain the cross-sectional di¤erences in exchange rate skewness. Following Brunner-
meier et al. (2009), we calculate realized skewness from daily exchange rate returns within
(overlapping) quarterly time periods, and then take the time-series average. We measure
the countriesexposure to funding risk by the estimated coe¢ cient of regressing individual
monthly currency returns on monthly average Japanese crash risk, .
Figure 4 shows a clear positive relationship between countriesexposures to funding risk
and currency skewness, i.e. returns to currencies with large negative coe¢ cients for  (such
as Australia or New Zealand dollars) are negatively skewed. The relationship between high
interest rate di¤erentials and negative skewness, observed in Brunnermeier et al. (2009),
is therefore associated with heterogeneous country exposures to funding risk. The result
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supports the prediction that the stock market risks in funding currency countries are a
signicant factor in explaining the negative skewness of investment currency returns.
[Figure 4 here]
In addition, our model predicts that a strong tightening of credit conditions is associated
with crashes of the investment currencies and large appreciations of the funding currencies.
To test these predictions in the data, we estimate a probit model where the dependent
variable is the likelihood of a crash in carry trade portfolio returns. We start by constructing
a carry portfolio, that holds a long-carry currency (AUD) and shorts a low-yield currency
(JPY), and we calculate its return against a basket of six non carry-currencies during that
month. The dependent variable takes value 1 if there is a crash in this portfolio (dened as a
negative return lower than minus one standard deviation on a given month) and 0 otherwise.
The results are presented in Table V, where we show that increases in funding crash risk 
indeed lead to a higher likelihood of currency crashes. As before, we also present the results
for the TED spread with very similar conclusions. Therefore Hypothesis 3 is conrmed
empirically.
[Table V here]
C. Explaining Speculative Activity and Carry Trade Returns with
Funding Risk
C.1. SpeculatorsTrading Activity
We now turn to the e¤ect of funding risk on trading activity in the currency market. We
follow Brunnermeier et al. (2009) and use the futures position data from the CFTC as a
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proxy for carry trade activity, measured at weekly frequency. In particular, we look at the
net (long minus short) futures position of noncommercial traders in the foreign currency,
expressed as a percentage of total open interest of all traders.16 Noncommercial traders
represent the investors that use futures for speculative purposes.
Table VI shows the results from regressing speculative activity on funding risk, for both
individual currencies involved in carry trades and for the long-short position (long AUD/short
JPY).
[Table VI here]
Funding risk measures from Japan are able to explain 28% of the long-short positions in
AUD/JPY (the TED spread can explain 18%). Furthermore, we obtain negative coe¢ cients
for the funding risk when explaining the long-short ows, i.e. a worsening of borrowing
conditions causes unwinding of carry trades. Consistent ndings are obtained for the futures
positions held in individual currencies - an increase in funding risk causes a decrease in
investment-currency positions and an increase in funding-currency positions (i.e. a reduction
of shorting). Moreover, and as predicted by condition (13), funding risk has greater impact on
carry-long currencies than on carry-short currencies. Therefore Hypothesis 4 is empirically
veried.
C.2. Carry Trade Returns
We now turn to the e¤ect of funding risk on currency carry trade returns. We follow the
common procedure in the literature and decompose the e¤ect of both the di¤usive volatility
and the crash likelihood into expected and unexpected components. An analysis of the
16A positive futures position is equivalent to a currency trade in which the foreign currency is the invest-
ment currency and the USD is the funding currency.
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partial autocorrelations of each weekly time series shows that they are best modeled with
three autoregression lags, as the shocks extracted in this way seem to be serially uncorrelated.
In particular, we t an AR(3)model to each one of the implied state variables
p
 and . The
expected market risks are the tted values of the estimation, and we denote them by
p

e
and e; the residuals, denoted by
p

u and u, are used as our estimation of the unexpected
innovations.17
If the abnormal returns to carry trades increase in funding risk as the model predicts,
then higher expected market risk at time t,
p

e and e, should lead to higher expected
carry trade returns, while the e¤ect of positive unexpected shocks (residuals), i.e. positive
p

u and u, should be associated with negative contemporaneous returns. To conrm this
conjecture, we regress monthly carry trade returns on the monthly averages of expected
funding risk and residuals. We also include lagged residuals of crash risk in our regressions
as, due to the slow moving capital (e.g. see Du¢ e, 2010), the market reaction may be slow
(lagged residuals of volatility are not statistically signicant and therefore are omitted). As
expected, we obtain positive coe¢ cients on the tted values and negative estimates for the
residuals. Table VII presents the results for the di¤erent carry trade portfolios, using stock
market related risks in Japan.
[Table VII here]
Noting the very high R2s of the regressions, it is clear that funding risk in carry-short
countries has a remarkably high explanatory power for carry trade returns, thus validating
Hypothesis 5.18 Moreover, we note that the funding-country equity market risks have a
17The residuals behave quite di¤erently in the cross-section. For example, the correlations between the
unexpected crash risksvary from a minimum of  1:18% (non-signicant correlation between US and Japan)
to a maximum of 29:7% (between US and Switzerland).
18As a robustness check, Table A.2 in Appendix shows the same results for the Switzerland funding risk
measures.
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more important e¤ect than the same factors calculated from the US market.19 For instance,
the R2 of the regression of HmL returns on US equity market volatility and crash risk is
below 24%, substantially lower than the t of 36% found for the case of Japan. This point
is further stressed in Table VIII, where we include both Japanese and US measures. First,
the predictive power of funding risk for carry trade returns is stronger for the case of Japan.
Second, in a full regression, only the Japanese measures remain statistically signicant. Both
conclusions also hold when considering Switzerland as the funding country.
Overall the inclusion of other measures of funding risk, such as the TED spread or VIX,
does not a¤ect the statistical signicance of the stock market risks in the funding currencies.20
Very similar conclusions, conrming the robustness of the results, are obtained if we include
in our regression other variables, such as the US stock returns, the Japanese nancial sector
index, or the innovations in global FX volatility (as in Menkho¤ et al., 2012).
[Table VIII here]
V. Conclusion
In this paper we develop a new measure of funding risk, allowing us to conrm the im-
portance of funding constraints in currency speculation, therefore extending the results in
Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2009). We measure funding risk for carry trades using
the equity optionsimplied stock market volatility and crash risk in Japan, the most typical
carry trade funding country. This measure seems to be a good proxy for speculatorsability
19During the period under study, the US interest rate levels are both below the median level (in the early
2000s and after 2008) as well as above the median level (between late 2004 and 2008). Therefore the role of
the US dollar as either a funding or investing currency has changed over time.
20A decomposition of carry trade returns on interest rate and currency e¤ects (not presented here) shows
that the TED spread seems to have a much greater relation to the interest rate component, while funding
risk is more important to explain the currency e¤ect.
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in obtaining funds for carry trading, as it has a remarkably strong explanatory power for
currency carry trade returns and speculatorstrading activity. We develop a stylized model
that is consistent with our empirical ndings.
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Figure 1. The E¤ect of Funding Conditions on Exchange Rates (PRELIMINARY
RESULTS). This Figure shows the dynamics of the purchasing power for each country, as a
function of the funding conditions, hL. The rst plot shows the case for the funding currency
(Country L), while the second plot shows the case for the investment currency (Country H).
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Figure 2. Monthly Carry Trade Returns for theAUmJP Strategy. This Figure shows
the monthly returns of the AUmJP carry trade strategy, which corresponds to an investment
strategy where investors borrow in Japanese yen and invest in Australian dollar. Results are
presented for the period covering January 2000 to December 2011.
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Figure 3. Volatility and Jumps. This Figure shows the estimated time series of the di¤usive
volatility (left column) and jump intensity (right column) for each market. Both risk measures are
estimated from option data on stock market indices. The time period covered is January 2000 to
December 2011. The data for Australia and Switzerland start in 2001.
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Figure 4. Skewness and Funding Risk. This Figure shows the positive relationship between
the country exposures to funding risk and average currency skewness. The exposures to funding
risk are the estimated coe¢ cient from a regression of individual monthly currency returns on the
monthly average Japanese crash risk. All the coe¢ cients in these individual regressions are statis-
tically signicant at one percent level, with the exception of CHF, DKK, and EUR (corresponding
to the unlled markers). For the currency skewness, we use daily exchange rate returns within
(overlapping) quarterly time periods, and then take the time-series average. The line shows the
tted values of regressing currency skewness on country exposures, and the corresponding t is
51%.
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Table I
Monthly Carry Trade Returns: Summary Statistics
This table shows the summary statistics of the monthly returns on the di¤erent carry trade strategies. It
includes the mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis and median. The total number of observations is
144 months. Numbers in parentheses show the standard error of the mean returns.
Strategy Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Median
HmL 0.0070 0.0416 -1.3407 7.3109 0.0111
(0.0035)
AUmJP 0.0059 0.0459 -1.2298 7.8532 0.0103
(0.0038)
HmL3 0.0040 0.0244 -0.8174 5.3299 0.0065
(0.0020)
HmL5 0.0022 0.0173 -0.8826 5.7698 0.0041
(0.0014)
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Table II
Our Measures of Funding Risk: Volatility and Crash Risk
This table shows the summary statistics of the implied state variables, i.e. the di¤usive volatility
p
 and
the jump intensity . Both variables are estimated using option data from the stock markets. It includes
the mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, autocorrelation and the correlation between volatility and
crash risk for each case. Results are presented for the main carry-investing country, Australia, for the main
carry-funding countries, Japan and Switzerland, as well as for the benchmark market, US.
Countries Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Autocorr. Corr(
p
v; )
Australia
p
 0.09 0.24 4.64 27.44 0.32 0.30
 1.29 5.21 6.24 47.19 0.27
Japan
p
 0.18 0.14 1.87 8.83 0.71 0.54
 0.83 1.93 4.83 31.53 0.80
Switzerland
p
 0.14 0.12 1.66 6.01 0.85 0.68
 0.66 1.12 2.89 12.54 0.72
United States
p
 0.13 0.13 1.85 6.94 0.84 0.50
 0.89 0.96 2.09 9.88 0.70
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Table III
Exchange Rate Volatility and Funding Risk
This table shows the explanatory power of funding risk in Japan for the average monthly currency standard
deviation, denoted by FX. For each currency in the sample of ten developed countries, the volatility is
calculated monthly using the daily exchange rate changes against USD.  and  are the monthly average
volatility and jump likelihood, computed from stock option data in Japan. Model (1) shows that the
funding risk measures in Japan alone, in particular crash risk, are able to explain 46% of FX volatility.
Models (2) and (3) show that alternative measures of funding risk, such as the TED spread or the Japanese
nancial index (JP Fin.), perform signicantly worse in explaining currency volatility. Model (4) shows the
regression results when including all measures. JP Fin. is obtained from Datastream and divided by 100
for expositional purpose. For each estimated coe¢ cient, the corresponding t-statistics are computed using
Newey-West standard errors (with a lag of ve months). ** (*) shows statistical signicance at 1 (5) percent.
The numbers in brakets show the mean Variance Ination Factor (VIF), where values of VIF smaller than
10 as shown indicate absence of multicollinearity issues.
FX (1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
JP 0.0011** 9.99     0.0009** 7.71p

JP 0.0017 0.78     0.0012 0.57
JP Fin.   -0.0007** -2.87   -0.0004** -3.21
TED     0.0021* 2.04 0.0005 1.10
const. 0.0056** 17.48 0.0092** 7.77 0.0056** 12.59 0.0070** 14.93
Adj:R2 64.42% 15.32% 22.86% 67.79%
VIF [1.78] [2.99]
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Table IV
Exchange Rate Correlations and Funding Risk
This table shows the explanatory power of crash risk for the correlation coe¢ cient between the main long
currency (Australian Dollar) and the main short currency (Japanese Yen). The correlation coe¢ cient is
calculated monthly, using the daily exchange rate changes against USD.  and  are the monthly average
volatility and jump likelihood, computed from stock option data in the Japanese market. Model (1) shows
that the funding risk measures in Japan alone, in particular crash risk, are able to explain 23% of currency
correlation. Models (2) and (3) show the results for alternative measures of funding risk, the Japanese
nancial index (JP Fin.) and the commonly used TED spread. The Japanese nancial sector index is
obtained from Datastream and divided by 100 for expositional purpose. Model (4) shows the regression
results when including all measures. The t-statistics shown in the second column are computed using Newey-
West standard errors (with a lag of ve months). ** (*) shows statistical signicance at 1 (5) percent.
AU/JP (1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
JP -0.1300** -3.58     -0.0673* -2.16p

JP 0.0384 0.10     0.0432 0.13
JP Fin.   0.0501 1.25   0.0507 1.92
TED     -0.3542** -5.07 -0.2577** -3.26
const. 0.2885** 3.16 0.0162 0.11 0.3893** 5.41 0.2056 1.90
Adj:R2 23.10% 1.86% 20.28% 28.45%
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Table V
Currency Crashes and Funding Risk
This table shows the explanatory power of funding risk for currency crashes. We estimate a probit model,
where the dependent variable takes value 1 if there is a crash in the currency carry portfolio, and 0 otherwise.
The carry portfolio consists on holding a long-carry currency (AUD) and shorting a low-yield currency
(JPY), and we calculate its return against a basket of six currencies (which does not include the investment or
the funding currencies) during that month. We dene a crash when the portfolio return is lower than (minus)
1 standard deviation of its returns during the whole sample period. In Model (1), we show that changes
in funding risk estimated from Japanese stock options data (), both contemporaneous and lagged, can
explain 27% of currency crashes. Model (2) considers the same type of regression for the TED spread. Model
(3) shows the result when including only contemporaneous changes and Model (4) considers all variables.
Contemporaneous and lagged changes of the Japanese nancial sector index or stochastic volatility are not
statistically signicant, so they are excluded here. The z-statistics are computed using robust standard errors
and ** (*) shows statistical signicance at 1 (5) percent. The last row shows pseudo-R2s.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef. z-stat Coef. z-stat Coef. z-stat Coef. z-stat
JP
L0. 0.9148** 2.63   0.6522* 2.08 1.9317** 3.48
L1. 0.1834 1.68     1.0221* 2.49
L2. 0.3421** 2.56     1.4137** 2.97
L3. 0.6614* 2.29     1.8674** 4.16
TED
L0.   2.3471* 2.50 1.5774* 2.40 3.3636 1.82
L1.   1.7988** 3.12   0.1328 0.14
L2.   0.6304 1.63   -3.4263* -2.05
L3.   0.3573 0.38   -3.2563* -2.36
const. -1.5650** -8.66 -1.4450** -6.03 -1.5601** -7.47 -2.1882** -5.75
PseudoR2 26.82% 29.52% 30.23% 54.12%
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Table VI
Weekly Carry Trade Activity
This table shows the explanatory power of funding risk for the weekly carry trade activity. The dependent
variables are the net futures position in AUD minus net futures position in JPY , as well the positions in
individual currencies AUD, CHF , and JPY . As before,  and  are the volatility and jump likelihood,
computed from stock option data in Japan. In Panel A, Model (1) shows that the funding risk measures
in Japan alone are able to explain 28% of the composite futures position. Models (2) and (3) show that
alternative measures of funding risk, such as the Japanese nancial index (JP Fin.) or the commonly used
TED spread, perform signicantly worse. Model (4) shows the regression results when including all measures.
Panel B shows the explanatory power of funding risk in Japan for futures positions in individual currencies.
The number of weeks considered is 626. The t-statistics are computed using robust standard errors and **
(*) shows statistical signicance at 1 (5) percent.
Panel A: Futures AU-JP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
JP -0.0353** -4.64     -0.0046 -0.52p

JP -0.9380** -8.85     -0.7309** -6.90
JP Fin.   0.0010** 10.13   0.0009** 7.65
TED     -0.1515** -6.10 -0.1291** -3.97
const. 0.4861** 21.31 -0.0938** -2.58 0.3518** 19.83 0.1825** 4.31
Adj:R2 27.59% 17.53% 5.50% 36.45%
Panel B: Futures Positions in Individual Currencies
Futures AUD Futures CHF Futures JPY
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
JP -0.0128** -2.82 -0.0145* -2.23 0.0251** 4.22p

JP -0.5371** -8.10 0.1499 1.44 0.3605** 4.31
const. 0.3868** 26.58 -0.0815** -3.74 -0.1011** -5.91
Adj:R2 14.80% 0.31% 11.59%
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Table VII
Explaining Monthly Carry Trade Returns with Funding Risk in Japan
This table shows the results of regressing monthly carry trade returns on funding risk, calculated from option
data on the Japanese stock market. e and e are the monthly averages of tted values for the volatility and
jump likelihood. u and u are the average residuals and correspond to the unexpected component of risk.
Four portfolio strategies are shown, AUmJP, HmL, HmL3 and HmL5, with corresponding returns calculated
for the period covering January 2000 to December 2011 (for a total of 144 observations). The t-statistics are
computed using robust standard errors and ** (*) shows statistical signicance at 1 (5) percent.
Strategy AUmJP HmL HmL3 HmL5
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
e 0.0168** 2.95 0.0148* 2.40 0.0106** 2.83 0.0050* 2.02p

e 0.0761 1.34 -0.0121 -0.23 0.0330 0.97 0.0164 0.67
u
L0. -0.0670** -8.55 -0.0576** -8.48 -0.0344** -7.39 -0.0222** -6.84
L1. -0.0214* -2.38 -0.0281** -2.98 -0.0167** -2.68 -0.0058 -1.55
L2. -0.0367** -4.48 -0.0413** -4.66 -0.0175** -3.90 -0.0058* -2.22
L3. -0.0110* -2.17 -0.0184** -2.65 -0.0137** -3.25 -0.0073** -2.67
p

u
L0. -0.2586* -1.96 -0.0033 -0.03 -0.0901 -1.12 -0.0813 -1.59
const. -0.0217* -2.17 -0.0032 -0.35 -0.0110 -1.89 -0.0049 -1.22
Adj:R2 42.25% 36.30% 33.65% 35.55%
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Table VIII
Carry Trade Returns: US Measures and Japanese Funding Risk
This table compares the explanatory and predictive power of Japanese and US measures for monthly AUmJP
carry trade returns. For each market, e and e are the monthly average tted values of the volatility and
jump likelihood, and u and u are the average residuals (corresponding to the unexpected component of
risk). In model (1), we consider the predictive power of Japanese funding risk, by using as independent
variables the tted values (known by investors in the beginning of month) and only lagged residuals. Model
(2) shows that the same predictive regression with US measures yields much weaker results. In model (3),
for robustness purposes, we use all measures together with changes in TED spread and changes in VIX over
the previous month. The t-statistics are computed using robust standard errors and ** (*) shows statistical
signicance at 1 (5) percent.
(1) (2) (3)
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
Japan e -0.0147 -1.27   0.0089 0.96p

e -0.2036** -2.64   -0.0285 -0.26
u
L0.     -0.0381** -3.21
L1. 0.0225 1.22   -0.0160 -1.09
L2. -0.0049 -0.32   -0.0381** -3.64p

u
L0.     -0.1259 -0.75
L1. 0.6280** 3.82   0.1969 0.91
L2. 0.4363** 2.83   0.0458 0.36
US e   -0.0252* -2.17 -0.0096 -0.57p

e   -0.0461 -0.58 -0.0592 -0.85
u
L0.     -0.0003 -0.01
L1.   0.0494 1.96 0.0355 0.90
L2.   0.0350 1.58 0.0074 0.26p

u
L0.     -0.2268 -1.08
L1.   -0.0697 -0.35 -0.1453 -0.70
L2.   0.2081 0.91 0.4138* 2.23
TED     -0.0244** -2.72
V IX     -0.0017 -1.60
const. 0.0548** 4.13 0.0343** 2.87 0.0185 0.87
Adj:R2 16.92% 2.98% 56.91%
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Appendix A
Table A.1
Implied Volatilities across Markets
This table shows the Black-Scholes implied volatilites for all options. The rst column for each country
presents the average implied volatility and the second column the corresponding standard deviation. Results
are shown for di¤erent levels of moneyness and time to maturity. The rst column shows the three classes of
moneyness considered, where "Low" corresponds to S=K < 0:95, "Mid" corresponds to 0:95 < S=K < 1:05,
and "High" corresponds to S=K > 1:05. The second column refers to time to maturity measured in days. The
last row shows the number of option contracts (after ltering) and the number of trading days for each market.
Australia Japan Switzerland US
S=K T Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev.
Low < 45 0.376 0.187 0.308 0.132 0.278 0.128 0.303 0.114
[45; 90] 0.268 0.102 0.242 0.079 0.209 0.085 0.272 0.088
> 90 0.236 0.079 0.222 0.051 0.196 0.055 0.249 0.069
Mid < 45 0.281 0.186 0.251 0.110 0.195 0.089 0.226 0.103
[45; 90] 0.198 0.106 0.237 0.076 0.191 0.075 0.246 0.095
> 90 0.164 0.078 0.220 0.061 0.197 0.058 0.255 0.071
High < 45 0.387 0.234 0.313 0.129 0.256 0.092 0.305 0.112
[45; 90] 0.248 0.130 0.270 0.090 0.228 0.079 0.301 0.094
> 90 0.161 0.073 0.234 0.064 0.219 0.054 0.285 0.074
Contracts (days) 191,989 (2,630) 52,959 (2,561) 246,197 (2,311) 154,076 (2,541)
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Table A.2
Explaining Monthly Carry Trade Returns with Funding Risk in Switzerland
This table shows the results of regressing monthly carry trade returns on funding risk, calculated from option
data on the Swiss stock market. e and e are the monthly averages of tted values for the volatility and
jump likelihood. u and u are the average residuals and correspond to the unexpected component of risk.
Four portfolio strategies are shown, AUmJP, HmL, HmL3 and HmL5, with corresponding returns calculated
for the period covering January 2000 to December 2011 (for a total of 144 observations). The t-statistics
are computed using robust standard errors and ** (*) shows statistical signicance at 1 (5) percent.
Strategy AUmJP HmL HmL3 HmL5
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
e -0.0231 -0.93 -0.0202 -1.01 -0.0011 -0.09 -0.0022 -0.25p

e 0.1809* 2.35 0.1725* 2.20 0.0664 1.54 0.0333 1.02
u
L0. -0.0682** -2.96 -0.0541** -2.85 -0.0335** -3.12 -0.0234** -3.37
L1. 0.0225 0.53 0.0041 0.12 -0.0059 -0.28 -0.0006 -0.05
L2. 0.0019 0.07 -0.0220 -1.03 -0.0061 -0.48 0.0023 0.25
L3. -0.0011 -0.05 -0.0255 -1.21 -0.0147 -1.19 -0.0046 -0.54
p

u
L0. -0.4664* -4.37 -0.2635* -2.27 -0.2509** -4.48 -0.1746** -3.85
const. -0.0054 -0.40 -0.0055 -0.50 -0.0056 -0.85 -0.0014 -0.33
Adj:R2 37.75% 31.99% 29.38% 28.08%
50
Jan00 Jan02 Feb04 Mar06 Apr08 May10
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
Panel A: Net Interbank Assets of Foreign Banks in Japan (% of Total Assets)
Jan00 Jan02 Feb04 Mar06 Apr08 May10
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
Panel B: Net Interoffice Accounts of Foreign Banks in Japan (% of Total Assets)
Figure A.1. Balance Sheet Components of Foreign Banks in Japan. Panel A shows
the time-series of the monthly net interbank assets of foreign banks in Japan, measured as call
loans minus call money and expressed in percentage of the total nancial assets of those banks.
Similarly, the aggregate net intero¢ ce accounts (Panel B) is measured as the asset minus liabilities
intero¢ ce components, expressed as a percentage of total nancial assets of those banks. The data
is available from Bank of Japan. Over our sample period, the correlation coe¢ cient between the
two series is -65.10%. This strongly negative relation is in line with the ndings in Hattori and
Shin (2009), and can be interpreted as evidence that the Japan o¢ ces of the foreign banks are
channeling yen liquidity out of Japan.
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Figure A.2. Carry Trade Activity and Net Intero¢ ce Accounts in Japan. This
Figure shows the comovement of the (monthly average) of net future postions in JPY and the
(symmetric) of the monthly net intero¢ ce accounts of foreign banks in Japan. The net future
positions are calculated as the long minus short futures CFTC position on noncommercial traders
in JPY, expressed as a percentage of total open interest of all traders. The aggregate net intero¢ ce
accounts of foreign banks in Japan is measured as the asset minus liabilities intero¢ ce components
(available from Bank of Japan), expressed as a percentage of total nancial assets of those banks.
Over our sample period, the correlation coe¢ cient between the net future positions in JPY and
the net intero¢ ce accounts is -51.54%. For illustration purposes, the plot shows the symmetric of
the net intero¢ ce accounts (a positive value implies that foreign banks hold a net long position in
Japanese assets).
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Figure A.3. Financial Conditions in Japan. This Figure shows the comovement of the
Japanese nancial sector index (taken from Datastream) and the net intero¢ ce accounts of foreign
banks in Japan. The aggregate net intero¢ ce accounts of foreign banks in Japan are measured
as the asset minus liabilities intero¢ ce components (available from Bank of Japan), expressed as
a percentage of total nancial assets of those banks. Over our sample period, the correlation
coe¢ cient between the two series is 87.23%.
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Appendix B
In Section I we characterized both the unconstrained and constrained equilibria, ignoring
the possibility of switches between the two regimes. In this appendix we fully characterize
the equilibrium, by solving for the optimal conditions in the region where the probability of
funding constraints being binding is strictly between zero and one. As the distribution of
i;t in this case is not Normal, the investorsrst order conditions (9) and (8) no longer hold.
Therefore we start by determining the new optimality conditions under this more general
framework and then calibrate the model and present the simulation results.
Domestic Investors First, given that the funding constraints are not binding for domestic
investors, recall that their optimization problem is to choose

mi;t; b
d
i;t
	
so as to maximize
 Ete act+1. Taking rst order conditions and using Leibniz rule, it is easy to show that:
(1 + rf )i;t   Ai;t
M i
=
Et
h
i;t+1e
 abdi;ti;t+1
i
Et
h
e ab
d
i;ti;t+1
i : (B.1)
Notice that, in Section I, we were able to further simplify condition (B.1) by using the
log-Normal properties. In this case, we have:
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and, using expressions (B.2) in (B.1), we obtain condition (9) in the text.21
21The second equality in conditions (B.2) can be easily derived from the fact that:
Et

e ab

=
Z

1

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( )2
22
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22 d,
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Speculators Speculators in country L will choose

mL;t; b
s
L;t; b
s
H;t
	
so as to maximize
 Ete act+1, subject to bsL;t   hL;t. Letting t be the Lagrange multiplier on the fund-
ing constraint and noting that:
@
@bsL;t

Et
 
e ab
s
L;tL;t+1 absH;tH;t+1

= Et
  aL;t+1e absL;tL;t+1 absH;tH;t+1 , (B.3)
we can use the rst order conditions for mL;t and bsL;t to obtain:
(1 + rf ) L;t   AL;t
ML
=
Et

L;t+1e
 absL;tL;t+1 absH;tH;t+1

Et

e ab
s
L;tL;t+1 absH;tH;t+1
   t
aEte act+1
, (B.4)
where t
 
bsL;t + hL;t

= 0. Similarly for bsH;t:
(1 + rf ) H;t   AH;t
MH
=
Et

H;t+1e
 absL;tL;t+1 absH;tH;t+1

Et

e ab
s
L;tL;t+1 absH;tH;t+1
 . (B.5)
As above, the optimal choice for bsi;t in Section I (given by condition (8)), is a special
case of conditions (B.4) and (B.5) above. To see this, note that under the joint normality
assumption of (L; H), we can write Et
h
e a(b
s
L;tL;t+1+b
s
H;tH;t+1)
i
as:
e a(b
s
L;tEt[L;t+1]+bsH;tEt[H;t+1])+ 12a2(bsL;t)
2
2L+
1
2
a2(bsH;t)
2
2H+a
2bsL;tb
s
H;tLH (B.6)
and, with some additional algebra, it can also be shown that:
Et

i;t+1e
 absL;tL;t+1 absH;tH;t+1

Et

e ab
s
L;tL;t+1 absH;tH;t+1
 = Et [i;t+1]  absi;t2i   absj;tij (B.7)
where we drop subscripts and superscripts for ease of notation.
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Equilibrium Conditions Summarizing the conditions above, the system of equilibrium
conditions is given by:
(1 + rf ) L;t   AL;t
ML
=
Et
h
L;t+1e
 aL;t+1bdL;t
i
Et
h
e aL;t+1b
d
L;t
i ; (B.8)
(1 + rf ) H;t   AH;t
MH
=
Et
h
H;t+1e
 aH;t+1bdH;t
i
Et
h
e aH;t+1b
d
H;t
i ;
(1 + rf )L;t   AL;t
ML
=
Et

L;t+1e
 absL;tL;t+1 absH;tH;t+1

Et

e ab
s
L;tL;t+1 absH;tH;t+1
   t
aEte act+1
;
(1 + rf ) H;t   AH;t
MH
=
Et

H;t+1e
 absL;tL;t+1 absH;tH;t+1

Et

e ab
s
L;tL;t+1 absH;tH;t+1
 ;
together with the market clearing conditions bdi;t = M
d
i;t =
M i (ki+kj)bsi;t
1 ki and t
 
bsL;t + hL;t

=
0.
Calibration and Numerical Solution Given the equilibrium conditions dened above,
we calibrate the model using the following parameter selection: AL = 8:0, AH = 22:4,
rf = 0:05, ML = 14:0, MH = 14:8, h = 6:7, h = 1:7, kL = kH = 0:05, U = 0:9, A;L = 1:5,
A;H = 2, a = 1:08,  = 0. For numerically solving the model, we use as initial guesses
the equilibrium conditions derived for the cases where the contraints are never binding or
always binding. We then search from a wide set of piecewise linear functions for s and
bHs the ones that most accurately solve the equations in B.8. We rule out mixed equilibria
by requiring that bsL;t = hL;t with probability one in the region where the constraints are
binding. The resulting simulation plot for each country is shown in Figure 1.
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